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ABSTRACT
Studies on prospective memory (PM) development in adolescents
point to age-related increases through to adulthood. The goal of
the present study was to examine whether instructing adolescents
to engage in an episodic prospection of themselves executing
future actions (i.e., future thinking) when forming an intention
would improve their PM performance and reduce age-related
diﬀerences. Further, we set out to explore whether future thinking
instructions result in stronger memory traces and/or stronger cue–
context associations by evaluating retrospective memory for the
PM cues after task completion and monitoring costs during PM
task processing. Adolescents and young adults were allocated to
either the future thinking, repeated-encoding or standard condi-
tion. As expected, adolescents had fewer correct PM responses
than young adults. Across age groups, PM performance in the
standard condition was lower than in the other encoding condi-
tions. Importantly, the results indicate a signiﬁcant interaction of
age by encoding condition. While adolescents beneﬁted most
from future thinking instructions, young adults performed best in
the repeated-encoding condition. The results also indicate that the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking may result from deeper inten-
tion-encoding through the simulation of future task performance.
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Prospective memory (PM) refers to the ability to remember to carry out future inten-
tions at a certain time (time-based PM, such as remembering to attend a tennis training
session at 2 p.m.) or following a speciﬁc external cue (event-based PM, such as
remembering to give a permission slip for the next school trip to your parents to
sign; see Ellis, 1996). PM is critically important for developing autonomy and being able
to live independently in adolescence and young adulthood. Prospective remembering
comprises multiple phases that rely on diﬀerent cognitive processes (Ellis, 1996). First,
the intention needs to be formed. During this intention-encoding phase, it is planned
when and how the intention will be performed. Then, the intention is stored in
retrospective memory, while the individual is busily engaged in other ongoing activities
and may monitor for the PM target cue or target time. When the moment for execution
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of the intention arises, the intended action has to be retrieved, other ongoing activities
have to be inhibited, and the individual has to switch to the prospective intention and
perform it as planned. Thus, in addition to retrospective memory, executive functions
such as planning, monitoring for the PM cue, inhibition and switching play a critical
role in the PM process (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002; Schnitzspahn,
Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller, & Kliegel, 2013). Given that PM paradigms require participants to
work simultaneously on an ongoing activity and a PM task, both tasks compete for
(limited) attentional resources (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001, 2004). In
their inﬂuential multi-process framework, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggest that
the extent to which the retrieval of delayed intention relies on automatic processes as
opposed to strategic processes which demand the use of executive control depends on
various factors such as the characteristics of the task (e.g., its importance) and the
individual itself (e.g., available resources; see Kliegel, Altgassen, Hering, & Rose, 2011).
In contrast, the preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM) model (Smith,
2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) states that PM performance is never automatic, but always
relies on eﬀortful, capacity-consuming processes due to consistent monitoring for the
PM cue. Slower reaction times in the ongoing task with a PM task embedded compared
to reaction times in the ongoing task alone (so-called monitoring costs) have been
interpreted as evidence for monitoring activities. Both the multi-process framework and
the PAM model predict larger age diﬀerences in PM tasks which require high levels of
executive control, as attentional resources are still developing across childhood and
adolescence (Gathercole, 1998).
Early studies on PM development have indicated age-related increases in PM
performance across childhood and adolescence, yet they have been predominantly
descriptive in nature (for a review on childhood, see Mahy, Moses, & Kliegel, 2014;
for studies comprising adolescents, see Wang et al., 2011; Wang, Kliegel, Yang, & Liu,
2006; Zimmermann & Meier, 2006) and it is only now that research is beginning to
explore the underlying mechanisms of such age-related eﬀects. Developmental
improvements in PM performance have mainly been attributed to the parallel devel-
opment of executive functions (e.g., Altgassen, Vetter, Phillips, Akgün, & Kliegel, 2014;
Wang et al., 2011), and thus the ongoing development of the prefrontal cortex into
young adulthood (Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005; Luciana, Conklin,
Hooper, & Yarger, 2005). In general most research on age diﬀerences in PM has
examined the role of the person or task characteristics during the phases of intention
initiation and execution by manipulating the extent to which executive-control
resources are needed (Kliegel et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2011) or available to perform
the PM task (Mahy et al., 2015; Voigt et al., 2014). In line with the predictions of the
multi-process framework and PAM model, these studies report larger age diﬀerences in
PM tasks requiring more executive control or when fewer executive control resources
are available.
Only recently has the research started to explore the usefulness of encoding strategies
during the intention-formation phase to improve later PM performance (Chasteen,
Park, & Schwarz, 2001; Zimmermann & Meier, 2010). Despite the consistently-reported
poorer PM performance of children and adolescents compared to young adults
(Altgassen et al., 2014; Voigt et al., 2014), these studies have mainly focused on younger
and/or older adults. This lack of research on possible strategies to improve PM in
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children and adolescents is surprising given that it is considered to be an essential
precursor of independent living (Kliegel, Jäger, Altgassen, & Shum, 2008).
In terms of targeted strategies to improve PM performance, previous studies have
applied so-called implementation intentions which are speciﬁc if-then plans that “spe-
cify the when, where, and how of responses leading to goal attainment”, such as “when
situation x arises, I will perform response y” (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 494). Implementation
intentions are assumed to support automatic rather than consciously-controlled, goal-
directed behavior by linking a speciﬁc, situational cue (the if-component) to a goal-
directed behavior (the then-component; see McDaniel, Howard, & Butler, 2008; Webb
& Sheeran, 2003; Wieber, Von Suchodoletz, Heikamp, Trommsdorﬀ, & Gollwitzer,
2011). The underlying assumption is that the (increased) automaticity preserves atten-
tional resources for other cognitive processes and goal-directed responses, and conse-
quently enhances participants’ PM performance. Consistently, Zimmermann and Meier
(2010) found improved PM performance in older adults (but not in adolescents and
young adults) when participants were prompted to form implementation intentions in
comparison to standard PM instructions (for similar ﬁndings in older adults, see
McFarland & Glisky, 2011).
Recently, studies applying implementation intentions have augmented the verbal if-
then statement with an imaging component by asking participants to imagine how they
will perform the PM task later in the experiment (Kardiasmenos, Clawson, Wilken, &
Wallin, 2008; McDaniel et al., 2008; McDaniel & Scullin, 2010; Schnitzspahn & Kliegel,
2009). For instance, Chasteen et al. (2001) reported that older adults who were asked to
form an implementation intention and then imagine themselves executing the intended
action performed better than those who only rehearsed the instructions. Following this
line of research, Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2008) have noted that there seems to be
considerable overlap between PM and future thinking, and have drawn particular
attention to the close relation between the processes involved in future thinking and
those in the implementation of intentions. The authors point out that the implementa-
tion of an intention involves associating the intention with a speciﬁc future context,
which closely resembles the episodic simulation involved in future thinking (Leitz,
Morgan, Bisby, Rendell, & Curran, 2009; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008).
Moreover, the brain regions that are involved in projecting oneself into the future
(the frontal and medial temporal–parietal lobes; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009) seem to
overlap with those involved in PM (Cona, Scarpazza, Sartori, Moscovitch, &
Bisiacchi, 2015; West, 2011). Accordingly, there is evidence that—similar to PM
development—future thinking continues to increase from childhood to adolescence
(Gott & Lah, 2014). Furthermore, these assumed underlying neural areas (Casey
et al., 2005; Luciana et al., 2005) show continuous development into adolescence and
early adulthood. Importantly, however, the formation of an intended action is not
automatically accompanied by a mental simulation of the future situation (Szpunar,
2010) and the extent to which individuals spontaneously imagine future scenarios
when forming intentions remains an open question (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel,
Einstein, & Moor, 2007).
In line with the conceptual, neurological and developmental similarities between
future thinking and PM described above, studies ﬁrst provided correlational evidence
for signiﬁcant relations between the two constructs. For instance, Nigro, Brandimonte,
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Cicogna, and Cosenza (2014) investigated PM and future thinking in 4- to 7-year-olds.
Both cognitive functions were signiﬁcantly related in 7-year-olds, but not in the
younger age groups. Atance and Jackson (2009) addressed the relations between PM
and mental time travel in 3- to 5-year-olds and found signiﬁcant correlations. However,
when partialling out age, the relations were no longer signiﬁcant. Taken together, these
initial studies show relations between PM and future thinking in children but also
indicate that this correlation might only emerge later in childhood, and that only older
children may be able to make use of their ability to move themselves forward in time to
support their PM performance (Nigro et al., 2014). Surprisingly, studies on relations
between PM and future thinking in adolescence are yet to be undertaken.
It seems very likely that participants should beneﬁt from a mental simulation of the
intended PM task during encoding. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that simulating
a future situation may help to translate future-oriented cognition into action (Taylor,
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). So far, there have been four
studies investigating the eﬀects of future thinking as an encoding strategy on PM
performance in younger and/or older adults. Altgassen et al. (2014) gave the partici-
pants of their study instructions to imagine themselves performing the PM tasks at a
later point during the testing session, and reported beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking
instructions on PM performance and plan adherence in both younger and older adults.
Similarly, Neroni, Gamboz, and Brandimonte (2014) reported positive eﬀects of future
thinking on PM in a student sample. Leitz et al. (2009) and Paraskevaides et al. (2010)
both tested whether the provision of future thinking instructions would reduce the PM
deﬁcits associated with acute alcohol consumption in young adults. Results indicated
that future thinking did signiﬁcantly improve PM performance compared to a control
condition. However, a within-subjects design was used and the two conditions were not
counterbalanced; the standard condition was always administered ﬁrst, followed by the
future thinking condition. Thus, the improvements in PM performance may be
explained by practice eﬀects. Taken together however, these studies give initial support
to the prospect of future thinking having a beneﬁcial eﬀect on PM performance in
adults. Therefore, the ﬁrst goal of the present study was to test if these beneﬁcial eﬀects
extend to adolescents.
Another issue that is still under debate is the nature of the mechanisms underlying
the beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking on PM performance. Two hypotheses have been
put forward to explain the positive eﬀects of imagining the speciﬁc visuospatial context
in which the intention will later be executed on PM performance: a) deeper encoding of
the intention in retrospective memory (thus, stronger memory traces), and b) formation
of an association between the speciﬁc visuospatial context and the intention which may
later lead to the (somewhat) automatic retrieval of the intention during the delayed
performance interval (thus, stronger cue–context association; Paraskevaides et al.,
2010). Consistent with the latter hypothesis, Brewer and Marsh (2010) have reported
that the stronger the cue-to-context association formed at encoding, the better the
subsequent event-based PM performance. Speciﬁcally, they compared three conditions
that varied in the extent to which an association between PM cues and context (i.e., the
ongoing task) was possible. The participants performed poorest in the no-association
condition (here, immediate PM instructions were given before any information regard-
ing the ongoing task was received, which prevented the creation of any association
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between prospective intention and the ongoing task), better in the standard condition
(here, the ongoing task was ﬁrst introduced and thereupon the PM task) and best in the
strong-association condition (here, participants were asked to form an implementation
intention and to imagine themselves responding to PM target cues while working on
the ongoing task). However, whilst this study suggests that stronger cue-to-context
association leads to better PM performance, it does not provide any evidence as to
whether this improvement follows due to an increase in the automaticity of intention
retrieval and thus reduced monitoring demands. Further, supporting the assumption
that future-event simulation leads to “pre-experiencing” the future context,
Paraskevaides et al. (2010) found signiﬁcantly larger eﬀects of future thinking for
event- than time-based PM tasks in young adults. Event-based tasks provide external
cues that may prompt retrieval of the intended action during the delayed-performance
interval. Imagining later encountering these cues during intention formation may be
easier and more speciﬁc than imagining intention execution in a time-based task, which
does not provide an external cue indicating the right moment to initiate the planned
action and instead requires self-initiated time monitoring (Altgassen, Schmitz-Hübsch,
& Kliegel, 2010; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). However, these diﬀerential eﬀects of
future thinking on event- versus time-based tasks were not replicated by Altgassen
et al. (2014), suggesting that future thinking may not inﬂuence PM through stronger
cue–action association. Possibly, the additional time that participants get to think about
the PM task when receiving future thinking instructions is suﬃcient to lead to deeper
encoding and thereby improve performance. Thus, taken together, it is still unclear
what makes future thinking instructions eﬀective: is it deeper intention encoding,
stronger cue-to-context association, or both?
Therefore, the second goal of the present study was to address this open question by
experimentally exploring whether future thinking improves PM performance not only
when compared to a standard condition but also beyond the eﬀects of a condition solely
focusing on intention encoding. During the latter condition, participants were given
time, after a brief delay, to repeatedly read through the PM instructions. This repetition
of the task instructions should (primarily) deepen the memory traces for the intention
in retrospective memory without aﬀecting the cue–context association. We expected
that overall participants would show better performance in both the future thinking and
repeated-encoding conditions compared to the standard condition. If future thinking
primarily enhances PM through better intention encoding, PM performance in the
future thinking and repeated-encoding conditions should be comparable, and both
conditions should show similar levels of retrospective PM cue recall. However, if future
thinking is eﬀective by simultaneously inﬂuencing intention encoding and the cue–
context association then participants in the future thinking condition should outper-
form participants in the repeated-encoding condition, and they should show increased
automaticity, which should be reﬂected in reduced monitoring costs. This research goal
is especially relevant from a conceptual perspective, as it helps to clarify the mechan-
isms underlying the positive future thinking eﬀects on PM performance observed in
earlier studies.
Further, we expected the young adults to show better PM performance than the
adolescents. Two diﬀerent sets of predictions are possible regarding the general impact
of encoding strategies on age eﬀects in PM performance. On the one hand, age eﬀects
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may be expected to be reduced in both treatment (future thinking and repeated-
encoding) conditions compared to the standard condition: adolescents are assumed to
have fewer attentional and executive control resources (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009),
therefore, their PM performance should beneﬁt more from the automatic retrieval and
deepened encoding induced by future thinking and repeated encoding, respectively,
compared to the performance of young adults. On the other hand, there is evidence that
the ability of adolescents to engage in future-oriented cognitions (Gott & Lah, 2014)
and the related underlying brain areas (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006) are still
developing. Therefore, instructions that emphasize the need to engage in future think-
ing might in fact be less beneﬁcial for the PM performance of adolescents than that of
young adults. Similarly, adolescents may be less able than young adults to make use of
the additional encoding time provided in the repeated-encoding condition, given the
ongoing development of the capacity to monitor one’s cognitive abilities and put in
place strategies to overcome potential weaknesses across adolescence (Paulus, Tsalas,
Proust, & Sodian, 2014).
Taken together, the ﬁrst goal of the present study was to test if the beneﬁcial eﬀects
of future thinking that have been reported in older adults extend to adolescents.
Further, the second goal was to explore the underlying mechanisms of the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of future thinking on prospective remembering (deeper encoding, stronger cue-
to-context association, or both).
Method
Participants
A total of 49 adolescents (age: M = 14.43, SD = 0.71, 21 males) and 60 young adults
(age: M = 21.18, SD = 2.38, 18 males) took part in the present study. The adolescents
and young adults were randomly assigned to one of the three encoding conditions (for
an overview of the exact group sizes, see Table 1). Age groups were parallel for verbal
ability, as measured by age-normalized scores on the vocabulary test of the Wechsler
intelligence scales (adolescents: M = 10.69, SD = 3.55; young adults: M = 10.22,
SD = 2.76, F < 1); depending on the age of the participants, either the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, Golombok, &
Table 1. Ongoing Task (OT) Performance and Recall of PM Cues.
Adolescents Young Adults
Standard
n = 16
M (SD)
Future
thinking
n = 17
M (SD)
Repeated-
encoding
n = 16
M (SD)
Standard
n = 20
M (SD)
Future
thinking
n = 20
M (SD)
Repeated-
encoding
n = 20
M (SD)
OT hits,
single task
.80 (.12) .86 (.17) .79 (.15) .88 (.13) .87 (.16) .89 (.09)
OT hits,
dual-task
.83 (.06) .85 (.15) .85 (.13) .91 (.06) .89 (.05) .92 (.04)
Monitoring
costs
3.37 (47.12) 38.03 (78.89) 49.47 (60.27) 1.05 (81.14) 38.58 (62.91) 9.71 (94.88)
Recalled
PM cues
.85 (.13) .98 (.06) .99 (.06) .99 (.06) .99 (.06) .95 (.13)
Note. PM hits, OT hits and recalled PM cues are presented as proportions of correct responses.
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Rust, 1992) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV;
Wechsler, 2008) was applied. The adolescents and young adults were recruited from
local schools and universities, respectively. Exclusion criteria were any presence or
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, as well as substance abuse. The study
was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in line with the Helsinki
declaration. Each participant was tested individually and before testing, all participants
(as well as parents for adolescents) gave written informed consent.
Materials
For the ongoing task, participants were presented with a picture-based two-back work-
ing-memory task (for a similar procedure, see Zinke et al., 2010). Black-and-white line
drawings of familiar objects from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture system
were displayed one by one on a computer screen. With each display a new picture was
presented. Participants were to decide whether or not the present picture had occurred
two stimuli ago by pressing one of two highlighted buttons on the keyboard. Items were
presented for 1500 ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms between trials. In the
course of the n-back task, 25% of all the stimuli presented were hit items. Participants
were ﬁrst presented with a printout showing four ongoing task trials to illustrate the
task and were then asked to complete a practice block consisting of 8 trials. This was
followed by 24 ongoing task trials (a single ongoing task block), after which the PM task
was introduced.
For the PM task, participants were instructed to press another highlighted button
whenever one of four speciﬁc pictures appeared. Participants were shown a printout of
the PM cues until they indicated that they had learned them. Thereupon, participants
were asked to write down the prospective cues. This was repeated until the participants
correctly reproduced all cues. Further, participants were instructed—upon presentation
of the PM cues—to ﬁrst respond to the PM cues and then to perform the ongoing task.
To ensure that participants had understood the instructions before starting the test,
they were required to repeat what they were supposed to do within the PM and ongoing
task. In total, four PM cues and 89 ongoing task trials were presented during the dual-
task block. The PM cues and n-back hit items never occurred at the same time. At the
end of the experiment, the participants were asked to recall all prospective cues,
followed by a recognition task in case not all PM cues were remembered. The depen-
dent variables were PM hits and correct ongoing task responses (both in proportion).
Responses were scored as correct if they were made before the next picture was
presented. Monitoring costs were assessed by subtracting the mean reaction times for
the ongoing task trials which were responded to correctly in the dual-task condition
from those in the single-task condition.
The adolescents and young adults were randomly assigned to one of the three
encoding conditions (i.e., standard, repeated-encoding or future thinking). In the
standard condition, participants were introduced to the ongoing and PM task as
described above, and performed the PM task after a ﬁlled delay, during which the
vocabulary test was performed. In the repeated-encoding condition, after having been
introduced to the ongoing and PM tasks, participants completed a diﬀerent cognitive
test (i.e., the Stroop test, 1935) and were then presented again with the printouts of the
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ongoing task outline and the four PM cues, and asked to study both tasks for two
minutes. Thereafter, they also performed the vocabulary test as a ﬁlled delay and
completed the PM task. After having performed the PM task, participants were asked
to write down what they did during the two minutes and to outline any strategies they
may have used. In the future thinking condition, after having been introduced to the
ongoing and PM task, participants were ﬁrst instructed to practice future thinking with
an example which was unrelated to the present task (i.e., imagine passing a message to
your mother/ﬂatmate when coming home). Participants were asked to imagine how this
event could take place with as much detail as possible. This training component took
about two minutes. Subsequently, participants were told to apply this encoding strategy
to the present task and vividly imagine themselves executing the PM and ongoing tasks
on the computer. Based on the future thinking literature (D’Argembeau & Van Der
Linden, 2004; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), participants were encouraged to close
their eyes and imagine as many sensory details (e.g., sights, sounds) as possible to
ensure the development of a vivid personal experience of the event. Participants were
ﬁrst instructed to say aloud what they were imagining for 20 s before they were given a
further 20 s to silently imagine the same task (Altgassen et al., 2014). After applying the
future thinking strategy to the present task, participants were asked to rate on a ﬁve-
point scale the vividness of their imagination as well as the degree of “living the
experience”, hence, how much the imagined experience had felt like being in the actual
situation. Thereafter, they also performed the vocabulary test as a ﬁlled delay and then
completed the PM task. The length of the ﬁrst delay—between the initial PM instruc-
tions (including the PM cue learning) and the imagination of the later task perfor-
mance, or repeated exposure to PM cues and the ongoing task—was the same for both
treatment conditions, as was as the total time spent imagining performing the PM task
or rehearsing the PM task instructions.
Results
A 2 (age group: adolescents, young adults) × 3 (encoding condition: standard,
repeated-encoding, future thinking) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
to explore the eﬀects of age and encoding condition on participants’ PM perfor-
mance. Signiﬁcant main eﬀects for age, F(1, 103) = 14.62, p = .001, η2p = .12, and
encoding condition, F(2, 103) = 5.30, p = .006, η2p = .09, and a signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀect, F(2, 103) = 6.01, p = .003, η2p = .11, were found. The young
adults had more PM hits than the adolescents (see Figure 1). Overall, participants
performed best during the repeated-encoding condition, followed by the future
thinking condition and lastly the standard condition. Further analysis of the
interaction with tests of simple eﬀects revealed that the adolescents did not per-
form as well as the young adults in the standard, F(1, 103) = 14.51, p = .001,
η2p = .12, and repeated-encoding, F(1, 103) = 11.94, p = .001, η
2
p = .10, conditions,
but not in the future thinking condition, F < 1, η2p = .004. Further comparisons
also revealed that encoding condition was a simple main eﬀect for the adolescents,
F(2, 103) = 5.06, p = .008, η2p = .09. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences were observed between
the standard and future thinking conditions (p = .003), and between the standard
and repeated-encoding conditions (p = .02), but the future thinking and repeated-
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encoding conditions did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from each other (p = .50).
Encoding condition was also a simple main eﬀect with the young adults, F(2,
103) = 6.29, p = .003, η2p = .11. Here, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the standard and future thinking conditions (p = .19), but both conditions diﬀered
signiﬁcantly from the repeated-encoding condition (standard, p = .001; future
thinking, p = .03), in which the young adults performed best.
To analyze the eﬀects of age group, encoding condition and task block (single,
dual-task block) on participants’ ongoing-task performance, a 2 × 3 × 2 mixed
measures ANOVA was conducted. Signiﬁcant main eﬀects were found for age
group, F(1, 103) = 10.44, p = .002, η2p = .09, and task block, F(1, 103) = 5.00,
p = .03, η2p = .05. The adolescents did not perform as well as the young adults and,
overall, the participants’ performance improved from the single- to the dual-task
block (see Table 1). All other eﬀects were not signiﬁcant, all Fs < 1.11. A 2 × 3
ANOVA was conducted to analyze the monitoring costs caused by the additional PM
task on ongoing task response latencies due to target monitoring (see Table 1). The
main eﬀect of encoding condition was approaching signiﬁcance, F(2, 103) = 2.33,
p = .10, η2p = .04. Age group, F < 1, and the interaction eﬀect, F < 1, were not
signiﬁcant.
A 2 × 3 ANOVA was carried out to explore diﬀerences in recalled PM cues after
having completed the PM task. There was an almost signiﬁcant age eﬀect, F(1,
103) = 3.91, p = .051, η2p = .04, a signiﬁcant eﬀect for encoding condition, F(2,
103) = 5.11, p = .008, η2p = .09, and a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect, F(2, 103) = 8.91,
p = .001, η2p = .15. The young adults outperformed the adolescents. Overall, the
participants of the future thinking and repeated-encoding conditions remembered
more PM cues correctly than those of the standard condition (see Table 1). Further
analysis of the interaction with tests of simple eﬀects revealed that the young adults only
performed better than the adolescents in the standard condition, F(1, 103) = 20.10,
p = .001, η2p = .16, but not in the repeated-encoding, F < 1.45, η
2
p = .01, or future
Figure 1. PM performance as a function of age groups and encoding conditions.
Note. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
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thinking, F < 1, η2p = .000, conditions. Further comparisons also revealed that encoding
condition was a simple main eﬀect for the adolescents, F(2, 103) = 11.71, p = .001,
η2p = .19, but not for the young adults, F < 1.19, η
2
p = .02. For the adolescents,
performance in the standard condition diﬀered signiﬁcantly from that in the future
thinking, p = .001, and repeated-encoding, p = .001, conditions.
Further, ANOVAs were conducted to study possible age-related diﬀerences in the
vividness of their imagination and degree of “living the experience” during the future
thinking condition. There were no signiﬁcant age eﬀects for vividness of imagination—
adolescents: M = 3.44, SD = 0.96; young adults: M = 3.50, SD = 0.89, F < 1—or living
the experience—adolescents: M = 2.75, SD = 1.00; young adults: M = 2.35, SD = 0.88, F
(1, 34) = 1.64, p = .21. With regard to spontaneously-applied strategies during the 2-
minute interval in the repeated-encoding condition, the following activities were
reported: just looking at the provided task material (8 adolescents, 6 young adults),
actively rehearsing PM cues and instructions (7 adolescents, 6 young adults), looking at
the provided task material and actively rehearsing PM cues and instructions (2 adoles-
cents, 7 young adults) and imagining later task performance (0 adolescents, 1 young
adult).
Discussion
The ﬁrst goal of the present study was to test if PM in adolescents and young adults can
be improved by future thinking. The second goal was to explore the mechanisms
underlying the beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking on PM and to try to disentangle
whether future thinking improves PM due to stronger memory traces and/or stronger
cue–context association. To this end, the adolescents and young adults were allocated to
either the standard, repeated-encoding or future thinking conditions.
As expected and in line with previous ﬁndings (Wang et al., 2006; Zöllig et al., 2007),
the adolescents gave fewer correct PM responses compared to the young adults. Across
the groups, the treatment conditions led to better PM performance than the standard
condition. Overall, the participants performed best during the repeated-encoding con-
dition, followed by the future thinking condition and lastly the standard condition.
Importantly with regard to possible conclusions about the underlying mechanisms of
the beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking on PM, analyses indicated a signiﬁcant interac-
tion of age group by encoding condition. Further analyses of the interaction eﬀect
revealed that the young adults performed better than the adolescents in the standard
and repeated-encoding conditions, while there were no signiﬁcant age diﬀerences in the
future thinking condition. This might indicate that future thinking did indeed lead to
deeper memory encoding and stronger cue–context association, which in turn may
have increased the automaticity of cue detection and reduced the strategic-processing
demands, which was especially beneﬁcial for the adolescents, who generally showed
reduced attentional resources in comparison to the young adults. However, further
comparisons also revealed that the adolescents performed signiﬁcantly better in the
future thinking and repeated-encoding conditions compared to the standard condition,
while there are no statistical diﬀerences between both treatment conditions. Of course,
this result does not completely rule out the possibility that future thinking aﬀects PM
both by generating stronger memory traces for the intention in retrospective memory
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and strengthening the association between cue and task at the same time. However,
given that the future thinking instruction did not improve PM performance beyond the
eﬀects observed after simply exposing the participants to printouts of the PM cues and
the ongoing task, the present ﬁndings suggest that purely repeated encoding, and thus
stronger memory traces of the PM task, may be the driving force for improving PM
performance in adolescents, and that this mechanism may also underlie the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of future thinking on PM. This conclusion is further supported by the ﬁnding
that in the adolescents, both the future thinking and repeated-encoding conditions
similarly improved the recall of PM cues compared to the standard condition. Further,
it is consistent with previous empirical evidence (Altgassen et al., 2014) showing no
diﬀerential eﬀects of future thinking on event- and time-based PM tasks, which diﬀer in
the extent to which the moment and context of intention initiation can be imagined.
Given that previous research shows that PM impairments in adolescents are mainly
caused by the retrospective and not by the prospective component of PM (Einstein &
McDaniel, 1990; Zöllig et al., 2007), it makes sense that this age group would especially
beneﬁt from strategies supporting the encoding of the target cues and the associated
action.
For the young adults, diﬀerent eﬀects of encoding condition emerged. In contrast to
the adolescents, the young adults showed signiﬁcantly better PM performance in the
repeated-encoding condition compared to the other two conditions, which did not
diﬀer from each other. Descriptively, the young adults achieved even less correct PM
responses in the future thinking condition. This ﬁnding is somewhat surprising, given
comparable recall of PM cues across all three encoding conditions and, importantly,
previous evidence of beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking in young adults (Altgassen
et al., 2014; Neroni et al., 2014). However, the current results are in line with various
studies on implementation intentions and imagery that have also not consistently found
beneﬁcial eﬀects on PM performance in younger adults (Zimmermann & Meier, 2010).
For example, McDaniel et al. (2008) did not ﬁnd any diﬀerences between a control and
an imagery condition; only a combination of imagery and implementation intentions
improved PM performance in young adults. Kardiasmenos et al. (2008) only reported
positive eﬀects of imagery in combination with implementation intentions in indivi-
duals with multiple sclerosis when a resource-demanding PM task was used, and not in
a task that encouraged automatic processing. The mixed results of Schnitzspahn and
Kliegel (2009) revealed that 60- to 75-year-olds beneﬁted from imagery plus implemen-
tation intentions whereas 76- to 90-year-olds did not, even ﬁnding detrimental eﬀects of
this strategy in the latter group when a simple task was used. Chasteen et al. (2001)
found positive eﬀects of imagery in combination with implementation intentions when
a non-focal PM task was used, but the same eﬀect was not found in a focal PM task.
Thus, it appears that imagery does not always lead to improved PM performance, and
the extent to which imagery is beneﬁcial for prospective remembering is inﬂuenced by
both the speciﬁc task demands and the characteristics of the individual carrying out the
task. Further, although imagery (especially in combination with implementation inten-
tions) may not exactly resemble future thinking, there is likely considerable overlap
with regard to underlying mechanisms, which may suggest similar inﬂuencing factors
for future thinking.
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In the present study, it is possible that the future thinking instructions interfered
with the strategies that young adults may apply spontaneously while encoding the
PM intention and later performing the PM task, for which they had ample time
during the repeated-encoding condition, therefore resulting in best PM perfor-
mance. When we look at the strategies that the participants spontaneously applied
during the time provided in the repeated-encoding condition, we can see two main
types being used: looking at the provided task material or rehearsing the PM cues
and instructions (or both). Descriptively, more young adults reported rehearsal of
the PM cues and instructions and especially a combination of looking at the task
material and rehearsing compared to the adolescents. Rehearsal of cues and instruc-
tions probably leads to deeper encoding than merely looking at the task material.
Interestingly, only one participant (a young adult) spontaneously imagined later
task performance and thus applied a strategy similar to future thinking. Thus, it is
possible that adolescents might be less likely to spontaneously apply eﬃcient stra-
tegies to support their PM performance compared to young adults, an assumption
that would be in line with the empirical evidence for the ongoing development of
metacognitive strategies throughout adolescence (Best & Miller, 2010; Weil et al.,
2013). However, given that we did not ask participants to verbalize what they were
doing during the 2-minute repeated-encoding interval, we have only their subjective
descriptions, given subsequent to task performance, and thus cannot draw any ﬁrm
conclusions about their cognitive processes or applied strategies, Further, partici-
pants may have had diﬃculties in consciously accessing and/or verbalizing their
strategies, or might not even have been aware that imagining a future situation is
considered as a strategy. Therefore, future studies should not ask participants to
freely report their strategies but to choose from a checklist of possible strategies.
Importantly, despite the diﬀerential eﬀects of treatment condition on PM perfor-
mance in adolescents and young adults, there were no age-related diﬀerences regarding
vividness of imagination or degree of living the experience in the future thinking
condition, indicating that both age groups were equally able to apply the suggested
future thinking encoding procedure. Regarding ongoing task performance, the young
adults performed better than the adolescents, which is in line with prior research
(Altgassen et al., 2014; Zöllig et al., 2007). Overall, the participants’ performance
improved from the single- to the dual-task block, indicating practice eﬀects. There
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in performance between the three encoding conditions,
and no interaction eﬀects. Thus, the beneﬁcial treatment eﬀects on PM performance did
not cause costs in terms of reduced ongoing task accuracy and cannot be explained by a
preferential treatment of one of the two tasks.
Further, to directly test whether the performance beneﬁts in the treatment con-
ditions were based on higher levels of automatic processing or more monitoring due
to the perceived higher importance of the PM task following emphasis of the task,
we examined the monitoring costs during the dual-task block of the ongoing task.
Importantly, there were no signiﬁcant eﬀects with regard to monitoring costs, which
were comparable for the adolescents and young adults, and greater for the repeated-
encoding and future thinking conditions compared to the standard condition. This
pattern of monitoring costs, in conjunction with the trend towards signiﬁcance of a
main eﬀect of encoding, suggest that both treatment conditions led to increased
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perceived importance of the PM task, which in turn led to increased monitoring. The
costs also imply that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking on PM were not the
result of enhanced cue–context association, which would have facilitated more
automatic, rather than strategic, processes, thereby reducing costs rather than
increasing them.
As brieﬂy mentioned above, one possible limitation of the present study is that
although the results indicate that beneﬁcial future thinking eﬀects in adolescents are
mainly caused by improved retrospective memory for the PM target cues, they do not
rule out the possibility that the cue–context association was also inﬂuenced but did not
aﬀect performance beyond the repeated encoding. To further distinguish between the
two mechanisms potentially underlying future thinking eﬀects on PM, future studies
should add neural measures to the behavioral ones. Studies on PM using event-related
brain potentials could help to identify diﬀerential neural correlates associated with
processes underlying maintenance of the intention and detection of prospective cues
(West & Ross-Munroe, 2002) and the retrieval of an intention (West, 2011). A recent
meta-analysis (Cona et al., 2015) on the neural underpinnings of PM showed that
frontal processes are primarily involved in the encoding and maintenance of an inten-
tion, while parietal processes mainly support the retrieval of the intention. Both neural
areas are known to develop throughout childhood and adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999).
If future thinking mainly inﬂuences PM through stronger memory traces and not
following an enhanced cue–context association, it should especially inﬂuence those
neural processes that are associated with intention retrieval but not with cue detection.
More research is needed that does not only manipulate executive-control (thus, frontal)
processes, but also retrospective-memory (thus, temporal-parietal) processes (e.g., by
varying retrospective memory load; Okuda et al., 2003).
Future studies should also consider using diﬀerent types of PM tasks such as
naturalistic tasks that have to be performed in everyday life such as measuring one’s
blood pressure several times per day (Brom & Kliegel, 2014) or sending a text message
to the experimenter at pre-speciﬁed dates (Aberle, Rendell, Rose, McDaniel, & Kliegel,
2010). Although participants in the present study reported that they were able to
imagine the PM task quite vividly, they only reported medium levels of “living the
experience”. The current PM task was rather abstract and probably new to most of the
participants. Furthermore, testing took place in an unfamiliar laboratory environment.
These factors might make it diﬃcult to develop a strong episodic foresight. Thus, from
an applied perspective it would be especially interesting to examine if the eﬀectiveness
of a future thinking instruction on PM performance may be inﬂuenced by the setting in
which the task takes place and former experience of the task.
A further limitation may be that the repeated-encoding group performed two
interpolated tasks (rather than one) between forming the PM intention and commen-
cing the PM task, which may have led to ego depletion and diminished PM perfor-
mance. To control for this possibility future studies should double the encoding time
relative to the standard condition.1
Taken together, adolescents showed poorer PM performance than young adults, and
overall the participants beneﬁted from future thinking instructions and performance of
repeated encoding. Importantly, however, diﬀerential eﬀects of the encoding condition
on PM performance were observed for the adolescents and young adults. In contrast to
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the adolescents, who beneﬁted most from the future thinking instructions, the young
adults performed better in the repeated-encoding condition than in the future thinking
condition. Further analyses indicate that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of future thinking may
result from deeper memory-encoding following prolonged exposure to the PM task,
and not from a stronger cue–context association.
Notes
1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.
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